Increasing Sanctions Against Iran
Increasing Sanctions Against
Iran
Fact Sheet
Office of the
Spokesperson
Washington, DC
July 12,
2012
________________________________________
I.
Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
Activities
One set of today’s actions targets
Iran’s nuclear and missile proliferation activities by
designating entities and individuals that are part of the
international procurement and nuclear proliferation
operations of Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO);
Iran’s national maritime carrier, Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL); and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) – all of which have been previously
designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, “Blocking
Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and
Their Supporters.” Treasury today is also updating the
identifying information for 57 vessels affiliated with IRISL
that had been renamed or reflagged since they were
originally designated by Treasury, and identifying seven
vessels affiliated with IRISL that have not been identified
previously. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from
engaging in any transactions with individuals or entities
designated pursuant to E.O 13382, and any assets the
designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction are
blocked.
Designations Related to MODAFL and AIO
Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed
Forces Logistics (MODAFL) oversees Iran’s ballistic
missile program. It is designated by the United States
pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2007, and has brokered a number of
transactions involving materials and technologies with
ballistic missile applications. Aerospace Industries
Organization (AIO), a subsidiary of MODAFL, oversees all of
Iran’s missile industries and was listed in the Annex to
E.O. 13382. Today’s MODAFL- and AIO-related designations
under E.O. 13382 include:
• Electronic
Components Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran
(ISIRAN)
•
Electronic Components
Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN)
are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because they are
owned or controlled by Iran Electronics Industries (IEI),
which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2008 for
being owned or controlled by MODAFL. IEI offers a
diversified range of military products including
electro-optics and lasers, communication equipment,
telecommunication security equipment, electronic warfare
equipment, new and refurbished radar tubes, and missile
launchers. IEI manufactures military tactical communication
systems and also electronic field telephones and
switchboards.
ECI conducts work on military and civilian
projects, to include semi-conductors, multilayer single and
double sided printed circuit boards, hybrid circuits, quartz
crystals and oscillators, high purity oxygen and nitrogen
gases, micromodules and electronic ceramics.
ISIRAN is one
of the largest and most experienced information technology
companies in Iran with expertise in building mainframes,
minicomputers and PC hardware, software and maintenance as
well as total solution turn-key projects.
To view identifying information for ECI
click here.
To view identifying information for ISIRAN
click here.
• Advanced Information and
Communication Technology Center
•
Advanced Information and Communication
Technology Center (AICTC) is being designated pursuant to
E.O. 13382 because it has provided technological or other
support for, or services in support of ISIRAN. According to
information available from computers abandoned by Hamid Reza
Rabiee in the United States, AICTC executes work projects on
behalf of ISIRAN. AICTC has five research groups in the
fields of Enterprise Software Solutions, Multimedia Systems,
Mobile Value-Added Services, Wireless and P2P Networks and
Bioinformatics. It also does work on GIS/GPS based tracking
systems and more.
To view identifying information for AICTC
click here.
• Hamid Reza
Rabiee
•
Hamid Reza Rabiee, a software
engineer, is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of AICTC.
According to information available from computers abandoned
by Rabiee in the United States, he has coordinated directly
with ISIRAN to establish and execute contracts benefitting
ISIRAN. Rabiee is the chief architect and founder of AICTC,
and is the current director of the organization.
To view identifying information for Rabiee
click here.
• Digital Media Lab (DML)
and Value-Added Services Laboratory
(VASL)
•
Digital Media Lab (DML) and
Value-Added Services Laboratory (VASL) were designated for
being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act
for or on behalf of Hamid Reza Rabiee and AICTC. According
to publicly available information, Rabiee is the founder and
director of DML and VASL.
To view identifying information for DML
click here.
To view identifying information for VASL
click here.
• Ministry of Defense
Logistics Export (MODLEX)
•
MODLEX is
being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned
or controlled by, or acts or purports to act, for or on
behalf of, MODAFL. As MODAFL’s primary exporting entity
since 2009, MODLEX was involved in the trade of exportable
military products to countries including Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Burma, Bangladesh and Nigeria, all in contravention of UNSCR
1747 (2007). UNSCR 1747 prohibits Iran from selling any arms
or related material. MODLEX represents Iran at arms trade
fairs worldwide advertising Iranian military products for
sale. MODLEX also conducts limited procurement activities on
behalf of MODAFL elements such as Iran’s Defense
Industries Organization (DIO), AIO, and Shahid Bakeri
Industrial Group (SBIG). Both DIO and SBIG are sanctioned
under UNSCR 1737 for their links to Iran’s missile program
through MODAFL and AIO, respectively.
The Annex to UNSCR
1929 (2010) lists MODLEX as an entity involved in Iran’s
nuclear or ballistic missile activities and identified
MODLEX as being owned or controlled by MODAFL.
To view identifying information for MODLEX
click here.
• Daniel Frosch and
International General Resourcing
FZE
•
Daniel Frosch is being designated
pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing or attempting to
provide material support for AIO.
Daniel Frosch for
several years has shown a steady pattern of providing
support to Iran’s missile program, including Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG) and SBIG, by supplying it with
sensitive material. He started dealing with Iran’s missile
industry while in his home country of Austria, under his now
defunct company Daniel Frosch Exports. He moved to the
United Arab Emirates(UAE) in 2006, where he continued
supporting Iran’s weapons programs. Frosch has supplied
Iran’s missile industry with a wide range of goods,
including electronics, testing equipment, and raw materials
such as graphite with potential applications in Iran’s
ballistic missile program. Frosch is the owner of
International General Resourcing FZE, located in the
UAE.
SHIG was identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and is
tied to Iran’s ballistic missile research, development,
and production activities. SHIG was also listed in the Annex
to UNSCR 1737.
To view identifying information for Daniel
Frosch click here.
To view identifying information for
International General Resourcing FZE click
here.
• Malek Ashtar
University
•
Malek Ashtar University is
being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or
controlled by MODAFL. Malek Ashtar University was
established in 1986 by Iran’s Ministry of Higher Education
and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, and it
is one of the major research institutes and educational
centers contained under the MODAFL umbrella.
Malek Ashtar
University was identified in the Annex to UNSCR 1929 because
it is a subordinate of the Defense Technology and Science
Research Center (DTSRC) within MODAFL. The European Union
designated Malek Ashtar University on June 24, 2008, because
Malek Ashtar University is linked to MODAFL. The University
also created a missile training program in 2003 in close
collaboration with AIO.
To view identifying information for Malek
Ashtar University click here.
Actions
Related to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line
(IRISL)
IRISL, Iran’s national maritime
carrier, was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13382
in September 2008 for its provision of logistical services
to MODAFL.
• Good Luck
Shipping
•
Good Luck Shipping (GLS), which
is located in the UAE, is being designated pursuant to E.O.
13382 because it acts or purports to act for or on behalf of
IRISL. GLS was established to replace Great Ocean Shipping
Services, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in
June 2011.
Great Ocean Shipping Services (Great Ocean),
along with Oasis Freight Agency LLC (Oasis) and Pearl Ship
Management LLC (Pearl), are being removed from the SDN List
because they were liquidated and struck from the Dubai, UAE
commercial register. Great Ocean was designated in June 2011
for acting for or on behalf of IRISL affiliate Oasis and/or
IRISL. Oasis was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in
September 2008 for being owned or controlled by, or acting
or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, IRISL. Pearl was also designated in June 2011
for acting for or on behalf of Oasis and/or IRISL.
To view identifying information for Good
Luck Shipping click
here.
• Identification of Renamed,
Reflagged Vessels and Additional IRISL
Vessels
•
Today, Treasury updated its List
of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN
List) entries for 57 vessels affiliated with IRISL that,
since their original identification, have been renamed
and/or reflagged by IRISL and its affiliates. OFAC is also
identifying 7 additional vessels as blocked property in
which IRISL has an interest. Including today’s additions,
Treasury has identified 155 ships as blocked property in
which IRISL or designated IRISL affiliates have an
interest.
To view a list of identified vessels click here (including updated IRISL ship
names) click here.
Designation
of IRGC Officer
The IRGC was designated
pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2007 for having engaged, or
attempting to engage, in proliferation-related activities.
The IRGC continues to be a primary focus of U.S. and
international sanctions against Iran because of the central
role it plays in Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear
programs and its involvement in serious human rights
abuses.
• Ali Fadavi
•
Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Ali Fadavi
is being designated under E.O. 13382 for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, the IRGC. Fadavi was appointed by the Supreme
Leader Khamenei as the new IRGC Navy Commander on May 3,
2010. On September 21, 2010, the Defense Ministry of Iran
announced that it had delivered the third generation of the
domestically designed and manufactured Fateh-110
high-precision ballistic missiles to the IRGC. Fadavi was
present at the ceremony where the missiles were delivered.
In November 2010 under Fadavi’s leadership, the IRGCNavy
organized and trained around 60,000 Basij students who
received instruction in techniques aimed to confront enemies
of Iran. Fadavi claimed that around 100,000 students had
become members of the Shahid Fahmideh Rahrovan camp of Basij
forces in Bandar Abbas after the launch of the education
project.
The European Union designated Fadavi on July 26,
2010, pursuant to European Union Council authorities, for
his role as an IRGC Navy Commander.
To view identifying information for Ali
Fadavi click here.
Designation of
Nuclear Procurement
Entities
• Pentane Chemistry
Industries
•
Pentane Chemistry Industries
(PCI) is being designated for engaging or attempting to
engage in activities that have materially contributed to, or
posed a risk of contributing to, the development of Iran’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs.
PCI is an
Iranian entity involved in building distillation columns for
the production of heavy water for use in Iran’s IR-40
heavy water reactor, under construction in Arak, Iran. Since
late 2009 PCI has been in charge of the distillation column
project at this reactor. PCI has also attempted to procure
phosphor bronze mesh as recently as July 2011. Phosphor
bronze mesh can be used in distillation columns for final
enrichment of heavy water. PCI began manufacturing phosphor
bronze mesh screens for the distillation columns in March
2012. Chemically-treated phosphor bronze, when knitted into
mesh screens, will be used as packing in the IR-40
distillation columns.
To view identifying information for PCI
click here.
• Hossein
Tanideh
•
Hossein Tanideh was a
procurement agent for Iran’s nuclear program through late
2011. He was the Vice President of Iran’s Pentane
Chemistry Industries Board of Directors as well as Managing
Director of the Sherkate Sakhtemani Rahtes Sahami Company
(also known as the Rahtes Company). Tanideh in 2010 and 2011
attempted to procure items for probable use in distillation
columns for Iran’s 40-megawatt heavy water research
reactor.
To view identifying information for Hossein
Tanideh click here.
• Center for
Innovation and Technology
Cooperation
•
The Center for Innovation
and Technology Cooperation (CITC) is in a position to
support a range of Iran’s weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and military procurement objectives. It has been
assessed that CITC facilitates procurement and technology
transfer from the science community to the military
services.
To view identifying information for CITC
click here.
II. Preventing the
Circumvention of International Sanctions
To
prevent the circumvention of international sanctions on
Iran, including sanctions on oil trade with Iran, Treasury
is publicly exposing numerous entities that are part of the
Government of Iran. Treasury is identifying these Government
of Iran entities pursuant to E.O. 13599, which blocks all
property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction
of the Government of Iran and of Iranian financial
institutions, and prohibits U.S. persons or those within
U.S. jurisdiction from having dealings with them. These
identifications are being issued to assist U.S. persons in
complying with E.O. 13599, but are not required for E.O.
13599 to apply. Every entity that meets the definition of
Government of Iran or an Iranian financial institution under
E.O. 13599 is blocked, regardless of whether it has been
identified and added to the SDN List. Today’s actions
include:
• Exposing front companies involved in
Iran’s oil trade
•
Aiming to undercut
Iran’s attempts to obscure Iran’s petroleum trade in the
face of increasing international sanctions, Treasury is
identifying Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA (Petro
Suisse), an entity incorporated in Switzerland; Hong Kong
Intertrade Company, a Hong Kong-based entity; Noor Energy
(Malaysia) Ltd, an entity incorporated in Malaysia; and
Petro Energy Intertrade Company, an entity operating out of
Dubai, as blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 because they are
owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the
Government of Iran. Each of these entities are front
companies for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),
Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd. (NICO), or Naftiran
Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sarl (NICO Sarl).
Prior to the
issuance of E.O. 13599, Iran’s NIOC, NICO, and NICO Sarl,
a Swiss subsidiary of NICO, were identified in 2008, by OFAC
as entities that are owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran within the meaning of the Iranian Transactions
Regulations. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from
engaging in any transactions with NIOC, NICO, and NICO Sarl,
without authorization from OFAC.
To view the identifying information for
Petro Suisse click here.
To view the identifying information for Noor
Energy click here.
To view the identifying information for
Petro Energy click here.
To view the identifying information for Hong
Kong Intertrade Company click
here.
• Identification of additional
Iranian financial institutions
•
The 20
Iranian financial institutions identified in today’s
action constitute new additions to the SDN List that were
blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599 on February 5, 2012. Three of
the entities identified today have previously been
designated by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) under other authorities, and their entries on the SDN
List have been updated to reflect their status as Iranian
financial institutions.
These identifications, which
include the publication of the names and aliases of the
Iranian financial institutions, are intended to aid the
public in meeting its obligations under E.O. 13599.
To
receive a list of these 20 Iranian financial institutions
please contact Treasury Public
Affairs
• Identification of NITC
Vessels
•
Treasury is identifying 58
National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) vessels, as well as
NITC and 27 of its affiliated entities, as blocked or
“frozen” pursuant to E.O. 13599. The NITC entities have
been identified as Government of Iran entities, and the NITC
vessels have been identified as property of the Government
of Iran. These identifications will aid companies and
individuals in complying with sanctions against the
Government of Iran and undermine Iran’s attempts to use
NITC front companies or renamed vessels to evade
sanctions.
click here (including updated ship
names) click
here.
ENDS
